A powerful way to understand where gaps are in the expertise of embedded system designers is to look at what goes wrong in real industry projects. In this paper we summarize the "red flag" issues found in approximately 90 design reviews of embedded system products conducted over a ten year period across a variety of embedded system industries. The problems found can be roughly categorized into the areas of process, requirements, architecture, design, implementation, verification/validation, dependability, project management, and people. A few problem areas, such as watchdog timers and real time scheduling, are standard embedded education topics. But many areas, such as peer reviews, requirements, SQA, and user interface design might be worthy of increased attention in texts and education programs.
INTRODUCTION
Most embedded education approaches stem from some attempt to create an overarching set of principles, list key topics, and adopt a particular teaching philosophy. That's a great basis from which to start. But, an interesting question is, what might that approach be missing?
In this paper we look at the problems and risks encountered by practicing embedded system designers. If they are making omissions or mistakes that materially affect the quality of their product or introduce undue risks to product success, then those areas seem reasonable to consider as potentially in-scope for embedded system education.
In this paper we identify 43 areas that were significant risk items for real products in a variety of embedded system applications. The items were identified over the course of more than 90 design reviews conducted by the author, spanning approximately the past 10 years. While the data points are self-selected and are vulnerable to reviewer bias, they nonetheless provide insight into what sorts of skill gaps and problem areas are present in embedded software projects.
BACKGROUND
The basis of this paper is a retrospective study of design reviews conducted by the author for a variety of embedded system companies. The companies are not identified to protect all parties involved, but most are divisions of large corporations or similar business entities which specialize in embedded systems. Such development groups would be expected to have mature and well organized procedures for designing and supporting moderate to large scale product deployments. A few reviews were of prototypes, but in all cases the developers were skilled, experienced, and tasked with designing real commercial products.
Product Types Included
The product types that were the subject of reviews generally include the following areas. This list is intended to give an idea of scope of the findings and does not necessarily include every single product: Some embedded application areas are absent from this data, such as consumer electronics and large military combat systems (although the author has had product experience with these areas in the past). There is no reason to believe our results are solely limited to the listed domains, but it seems plausible that concerns would vary depending upon which market segment a product is in.
Code size ranged from a few hundred bytes to about a million lines of code. Development team sizes ranged from one part-time developer to teams of up to 25 developers. (In many cases an overall system had many more developers, but only a specific subsystem was the topic of a review.) Most projects were in assembly language, C, or C++, but other languages were occasionally used. Developers most often followed Waterfall or Vee development approaches, but some products used Spiral, Incremental, or Agile approaches. Most reviews were of USbased teams, with a handful of reviews in Europe and Asia. Perhaps one fifth of development teams used development partners or remote team members in India or China. In most cases remote developers participated in reviews either in person or via conference call.
Systems were about evenly divided between small microcontrollers and bigger CPUs that ran some sort of RTOS. A very few systems used DSPs or FPGAs, and none used custom or domain-specific silicon. Product volume ranged from prototypes to hundreds of thousands of units per year, although most reviews were for products in the 1,000 to 10,000 units per year range.
The results of some design reviews beyond those in the data set were excluded due to contractual obligations or because they did not result in formal review reports. But the missing data would have been unlikely to materially change the outcome of this study.
Design Review Process
A typical design review involves the steps of setting up the review engagement, learning some domain background, obtaining as many project documents as possible, selectively reviewing documents, setting a meeting agenda, traveling to hold an on-site review visit, and generating a written report. A minority of reviews to examine very specific areas or answer narrow questions were done electronically, with no visit.
On-site visits typically lasted one day or, in some cases, two days. The amount of information available before the visit ranged from essentially nothing to thousands of pages of design information (often including complete source code listings). The degree to which developers self-identified problems before a visit varied, but most problems were identified by the reviewer without hints from the review team. More importantly, in almost all cases the review team accepted the problems identified as valid feedback.
(This is not to say that every recommendation was necessarily carried out. But, for the most part, teams agreed that the areas identified as critical risks were in fact significant issues that materially affected the likelihood of project or product success.)
A reasonable fraction of the design reviews, especially initially, were carried out by two independent reviewers in parallel, with a shared visit and jointly issued report. More recent reviews were largely single-reviewer events in large part due to economic constraints.
Most reviews were performed at about the time the product was ready to start acceptance testing or be released. In cases where a problem was identified, an attempt was made to trace back to a reasonable root cause. For example, a bug-prone module might be identified as having implementation problems, design problems, architecture problems, or requirement problems depending on which stage in the design process was the most effective place to have avoided the bug (and other similar bugs).
The primary output of each review engagement is list of recommendations, including "red flag" issues that present significant and immediate risks to the success of the project or product. Other, less pressing, "yellow flag" risks and reviewer observations are also listed in review reports. Values were not assigned to all topics in every review due to lack of time. Rather, emphasis was placed on areas that seemed to the reviewer and the developers to be the most likely place to be sources of major risk.
The study we present here is solely concerned with the red flag issues.
Over time, reviews became more formal and repeatable as a list of typical problem areas and review questions was developed using the input of a number of experts over the first few years of conducting reviews. This list was formally used for perhaps a third of the reviews, and the general knowledge of what was in this list informed most of the other reviews. The list presented in this paper does not strictly conform to the items in that proprietary checklist, but is similar in nature. The checklist has approximately three times as many topics as the red flag list below. In other words, two thirds of the entries on the checklist are worth asking about, but have failed to generate any red flag in a decade of performing reviews.
There is no way to know how many significant risks were missed because reviewers didn't think to ask the right questions. However, the chance of this happening was reduced by initially by the use of multiple reviewers, and in later years by the use of a comprehensive checklist-based triage process as just described.
Background of designers
The design teams reviewed varied in technical background significantly. Many team members had degrees and experience in mechanical or electrical (non-electronic) engineering. A number had electronic and computer engineering degrees. A few had computer science or (rarely) software engineering degrees. For the most part, senior developers started as domain specialists and picked up embedded computing on the job. Junior developers were more likely to have had software training of some sort, but in most cases had more of an electrical or computer engineering background.
Over the years, there has been a trend for many design teams to advance to a higher level of software process sophistication (for example, many teams progressed to SEI Capability Maturity Model [6] Level 2 or above). This is in large part due to a concerted effort by some corporations to improve software quality. It is also in part due to hiring of developers with formal software training into embedded system product teams. But, high process maturity is not universal across embedded projects. In particular, each company seems to find its own way up the software learning curve as it introduces the first non-trivial computing capability into its products and attempts to write software using domain experts who have little or no formal software training.
RISK AREAS IDENTIFIED
The following risk areas are identified as red flag (significant) risks in one or more reviews in this study. They are grouped and organized to provide some structure in terms of typical development process stages and activities. However, the ordering does not connote any severity, priority, or frequency. A typical item in this list was a red flag in a few reviews and a yellow flag in several more.
The examples and likely consequences of risk areas given are generally representative of the risks actually seen without revealing company-or product-specific information. (To the degree that examples or statements are true about any particular product, they are typically true of many different products that were reviewed.)
Development Process

#1. Informal development process
The process used to create embedded software is ad hoc, and not written down. The steps vary from project to project and developer to developer. This can result in uneven overall software quality.
#2. Not enough paper
Too few steps of development result in a paper trail. For example, test results may not be written down. Among other things, this can require re-doing tasks such as testing to make sure they were fully and correctly performed.
#3. No written requirements
Software requirements are not written down or are too informal. They may only address changes for a new product version without any written document stating old version requirements. This can lead to misunderstandings about intended product functions and difficulty in designing adequate tests.
#4. Requirements with poor measurability
Software requirements can't be tested due to missing or subjective measurement criteria. As a result, it is difficult to know whether a requirement such as "product shall be user friendly" has been met.
#5. Requirements omit extra-functional aspects
Product requirements may state hardware processing speed and hardware reliability, but omit software response times, software reliability, and other non-functional requirements. Implementing and testing these undefined aspects is left at the discretion of developers and might not meet market needs.
#6. High requirements churn
Functionality required of the product changes so fast the software developers can't keep up. This is likely to lead to missed deadlines and can result in developer burnout.
#7. No SQA function
Nobody is formally assigned to perform an SQA function, so there is a risk that processes (however light or heavy they might be) aren't being followed effectively regardless of the good intentions of the development team. Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is, in essence, ensuring that the developers are following the development process they are supposed to be following. If SQA is ineffective, it is possible (and in our experience likely) that some time spent on testing, design reviews, and other techniques to improve quality is also ineffective.
#8. No mechanism to capture technical and non-technical project lessons learned
There is no methodical effort to identify technical, process, and management problems encountered during the course of the project so that the causes of these problems can be corrected. As a result, mistakes made on one project are repeated in future projects.
Architecture
#9. No defined software architecture
There is no picture showing the system's software architecture. (Many such pictures might be useful depending upon the context -but often there is no picture at all.) Ill defined architectures often lead to poor designs and poor quality code.
#10. No message dictionary for embedded network
There is no listing of the messages, payloads, timing, and other information for messages being sent on an embedded real time network such as CAN. As a result, there is no basis for analysis of real time network performance and optimization of message traffic.
#11. Poor modularity of code
The design has poorly chosen interfaces and poorly decomposed functionality, resulting in high coupling, poor cohesion, and overly long modules. In particular, interrupt service routines are often too big and mask interrupts for too long. The result is often increased risk of software defects due to increased complexity.
Design
#12. Design is skipped or is created after code is written
Developers create the design (usually in their heads) as they are writing the code instead of designing each module before that module is implemented. The design might be written down after code is written, but usually there is no written design. As a result, the structure of the implementation is messier than it ought to be. #13. Flowcharts are used when statecharts would be more appropriate Flowcharts are used to represent designs for functions that are inherently state-based or modal and would be better represented using a state machine design abstraction. Associated code usually has deeply nested, repetitive "if" condition clauses to determine what state the system is in rather than having an explicit state variable used to control a case statement structure in the implementation. The result is code that is significantly more bug prone and more difficult to understand than a state-machine based design.
#14. No real time schedule analysis
There is no methodical approach to real time scheduling. Typically an ad hoc approach to real time scheduling is used, frequently featuring conditional execution of some tasks depending upon system load. Testing rather than an analytic approach is used to ensure real time deadlines will be met. Often there is no sure way to know if worst case timing has been experienced during such testing, and there is risk that deadlines will be missed during system operation.
#15. No methodical approach to user interface design
The user interface does not follow established principles (e.g., [5] ), and is likely to make using the product difficult or errorprone. The interface might not take into account the needs of users in different demographic groups (e.g., users who are colorblind, hearing impaired, wearing gloves, or who have trouble grasping small objects due to arthritis).
Implementation
#16. Inconsistent coding style
Coding style varies dramatically across the code base, usually in part due to lack of a written coding style guideline. Code comments vary significantly in frequency, level of detail, and type of content. This makes it more difficult to understand and maintain the code.
#17. Resources too full
Memory or CPU resources are overly full, leading to risk of missing real time deadlines and significantly increased development costs. An extreme (but not infrequent) example is to have zero bytes of program and data memory left over on a small processor. Significant developer time and energy can be spent squeezing software and data to fit rather than developing new functionality.
#18. Too much assembly language
Assembly language is used for most or all of the code when an adequate high level language compiler is available. Sometimes this is due to lack of big enough hardware resources to execute compiled code. But more often it is due to developer preference, reuse of previous project code, or a need to economize on purchasing development tools. Assembly language software is usually more expensive to develop and more bug-prone than high level language code.
#19. Too many global variables
Global variables are used instead of parameters for passing information among software modules. The result is often code that has poor modularity and is brittle to changes.
#20. Ignoring compiler warnings
Programs compile with ignored warnings and/or the compilers used do not have robust warning capability. A static analysis tool is not used to make up for poor compiler warning capabilities. The result can be that software defects which could have been caught by the compiler must be found via testing, or miss detection entirely. If assembly language is used extensively, it may contain the types of bugs that a good static analysis tool would have caught in a high level language.
#21. Inadequate concurrency management
Mutexes or other appropriate concurrent data access approaches aren't being used. This leads to potential race conditions and can result in tricky timing bugs.
#22. Use of home-made RTOS
An in-house developed and maintained RTOS is being used instead of a commercial (or free third party) operating system. While the result is sometimes technically excellent, it also commits the company to maintaining RTOS development skills as a core competency, which may not be the best strategic use of limited resources.
Verification & Validation
#23. No peer reviews
Code and other documents are not subject to a methodical peer review, or undergo ineffective peer reviews. As a result, most bugs are found late in the development cycle when it is more expensive to fix them.
#24. No test plan
Testing is ad hoc, and not according to a defined plan. Typically there is no defined criterion for how much testing is enough. This can result in poor test coverage or an inconsistent depth of testing.
#25. No defect tracking
Defects and other issues are not being put into a bug tracking system. This can result in losing track of outstanding bugs and poor prioritization of bug-fixing activities.
#26. No stress testing
There is no specific stress testing to ensure that real time scheduling and other aspects of the design can handle worst case expected operating conditions. As a result, products may fail when used for demanding applications.
Dependability
#27. Insufficient consideration of reliability/availability
There is no defined dependability goal or approach for the system, especially with respect to software. In most cases there is no requirement that specifies what dependability means in the context of the application (e.g., is a crash and fast reboot OK, or is it a catastrophic event for typical customer?). As a result, the degree of dependability is not being actively managed.
#28. Insufficient consideration of security
There is no statement of requirements and intentional design approach for ensuring adequate security, especially for networkconnected devices. The resulting system may be compromised, with unforeseen consequences.
#29. Insufficient consideration of safety
In some systems that have modest safety considerations no safety analysis has been done. In systems that are more overtly safety critical (but for which there is no mandated safety certification), the safety approach falls short of recommended practices. The result is exposure to unforeseen legal liability and reputation loss.
#30. No or incorrect use of watchdog timers
Watch dog timers are turned off or are serviced in a way that defeats their intended role in the system. For example, a watchdog might be kicked by an interrupt subroutine that is triggered by a timer regardless of the status of the rest of the software system. Systems with ineffective watchdog timers may not reset themselves after a software timing fault.
#31. Insufficient consideration of system reset approach
System resets might not ensure a safe state during reboots that occur when the system is already in operation, resulting in unsafe transient actuator commands.
#32. Neither instrumentation nor error logs
There is no run-time instrumentation to record anomalous operating conditions, nor are there error logs to record events such as software crashes. This makes it difficult to diagnose problems in units returned for service.
#33. No software update plan
There is no plan for distributing patches or software updates, especially for systems which do not have continuous Internet access. This can be an especially significant problem if the security strategy ends up requiring regular patch deployment. Updating software may require technician visits, equipment replacement, or other expensive and inconvenient measures.
#34. No IP protection plan
There is no plan to protect intellectual property of the product from code extraction, reverse engineering, or hardware/software cloning. (Protection strategies can be legal as well as technical.) As a result, competitors may find it excessively easy to successfully extract and sell products with exact software images or extracted proprietary software technology.
Project Management
#35. No version control
Sometimes source code is not under version control. More commonly, the source code is under version control but associated tools, libraries, and other support software components are not. As a result, it may be difficult or impossible to recreate and modify old software versions to fix bugs.
#36. No backward compatibility and version management
plan There is no plan for dealing with backward compatibility with old products, product migration, or installations with mixed old and new product versions. The result may be incompatibilities with fielded equipment or a combinatorial explosion of multicomponent compatibility testing scenarios necessary for system validation.
#37. Use of cheap tools (software components, etc.) instead of good ones
Developers have inadequate or substandard tools (for example, free demo compilers instead of paid-for full-featured compilers) because tool costs are can't be reckoned against savings in developer time in the cost accounting system being used. As a result, developers spend significant time creating or modifying tools to avoid spending money.
#38. Schedule not taken seriously
The software development schedule is externally imposed on an arbitrary basis or otherwise not grounded in reality, and so is not taken seriously by anyone. As a result, developers may burn out or simply feel they have no stake in schedules.
#39. Presumption in project management that software is free
Project managers and/or customers (and sometimes developers) make decisions that presume software costs virtually nothing to develop or change. This is one contributing cause of requirements churn.
#40. No risk mitigation for problems with external tools and
components External tools, software components, and vendors are a critical part of the system development plan, and no strategy is in place to deal with unexpected bugs, personnel turnover, or business failure of partners.
#41. Disaster recovery not tested
Backups and disaster recovery plans may be in place but untested. As a result, it may be that data won't be recoverable when a real problem occurs.
People
#42. High turnover and developer overload
Developers have a high turnover rate. This is especially prevalent with work outsourced to India and China. As a result, code quality and style varies. Lack of a robust paper trail makes it difficult to continue development. Often more important is that replacement developers may lack the domain experience necessary for understanding the details of system requirements.
#43. No training for managing outsource relationships
Engineers who are responsible for interacting with outsource partners do not have adequate time and skills to do so, especially for multi-cultural partnering. This can lead to significant ineffectiveness or even failure of such relationships.
ANALYSIS 4.1 Projects Don't Need To Be Perfect
It is important to point out that not every project needs to get everything on the preceding list perfect. Indeed, many projects had only one or two red flags out of that list, and most had fewer than five red flags. (Some -a very few -had zero red flags.) By the same token, most projects had many yellow flags, indicating there were areas that could be improved over time.
It is also important to note that the red flag areas were based on risk specific to a particular domain and product. A development team could totally ignore many or most items on the above list and, so long as that approach didn't create a significant risk of product or project failure, that wasn't a red flag. For example, having the watchdog timer turned off is likely to be a red flag on unattended equipment with 24x7 operational requirements, but might not be an issue on a non-critical hand-operated device that is power cycled before each use.
In other words, items were red flags because they were a big deal in the context of that particular product, not because they were on a list of best practices that had to be done regardless of project tradeoffs.
That having been said, identification of red flag issues was at the discretion of the reviewer with feedback from the developers being reviewed, and therefore somewhat subjective.
Back to Basics -But Less Than Expected
Perhaps surprisingly, there are only a very few risk areas that are almost universally accepted as embedded system core topics. Real time scheduling, watchdog timers, and concurrency management are likely to be on a typical embedded system educator's list of desirable technical topics for either a first or second course in the area. But most of the problem areas aren't like that. Many of the items are things omitted by typical embedded system texts and courses.
That doesn't mean core technical areas don't matter. We believe it is important to give embedded system designers a principled understanding of core engineering principles and underlying technology. But these results suggest that informally trained embedded designers (who have nonetheless been formally schooled in a certain way of thinking about technical problems in general) tend to find ways to fill in basic technical areas on their own, even if they didn't have technology-specific training. So, apparently, self-teaching with a book in one hand and a development board in the other works to an extent. But it doesn't seem to work when you get beyond the technical basics.
Most risk areas seemed uncorrelated with developer backgrounds, but there were a few areas in which team members' formal educational background affected likely risk areas. For example, developers with formal software training were more likely to use a version control system. However, differences were not as widespread as might be expected. In part, this is because nonsoftware engineers are trained to follow a methodical development approach (such as creating written requirements and formal test plans) for non-software aspects of the system, and that approach carried over to software. But, developers without formal embedded training are more likely to have gaps in the more advanced embedded-specific areas such as concurrency control and real time scheduling since they are beyond the scope of most introductory programming texts (and even many introductory embedded system texts).
Knowing You Have A Problem
Most of the problem areas might be characterized as having the property that they are the result of a gap in the developer's understanding or the software process being used. In other words, developers didn't realize (or didn't have time) to look for some types of problems. Basic functionality for a desired system was usually there at the time of the design review. For example, everyone had figured out by the design review how to use an A/D converter well enough to get acceptable sample quality. And they had found and fixed whatever bugs they were likely to find with their testing approach. The risks tended to come more from having a high risk of undetected bugs, missing chances to have avoided big problems that surfaced late in the project, and missing chances to avoid project schedule or cost problems.
On the whole, smart motivated developers can figure out most of the technology and fix most problems if they have a way to know what's broken. The biggest risks come when they don't realize something in their technology or development process is broken, or when they attempt ad hoc solutions to difficult problems because they don't know more robust solution approaches are available.
Weak Process Hurts
A surprise is that a significant fraction of the problem areas ended up being software process problems instead of technology problems. While many educators are technologists at heart, the fact of the matter is that poor software process is a huge problem impeding the success of embedded system development efforts. (It's hard to have a good product with bad technology. But it's also hard to succeed with an ineffective development process.)
The lack of process content in most developer degree programs is deeply ingrained, and has various sources. But it is really hurting embedded developers, and is a critical skill they must currently pick up once in industry.
Embedded Software Problems Are Only A Little Special
Most of the red flag areas would not be out of place in a list of IT project risks. We are, after all, talking about software and some practices are good ideas regardless of the domain. However, the ways to mitigate risks are often different for embedded applications than for desktop applications.
Five Forebodes Failure
One of the informal observations made across the course of these reviews was that developer teams with exactly 5 primary contributors usually fail. Invariably these teams had previously completed a project with 3 or 4 members, and increased the team size to tackle a more complex project without making any changes in their software process.
While this is an anecdotal result, projects that grow past 4 developers in size should seriously consider switching to a heavier weight software process (more paper, more formality, more methodical rigor). Smaller teams still seem to benefit from good process, but basically can get away with informality with less risk than larger teams working on more complex projects.
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 5.1 Formal Education Doesn't Affect Risk Areas Much
Embedded system software development is often performed by engineers with no formal training in that area. As mentioned previously, the surprising part is not that such developers have gaps, but rather that they seem to do a pretty good job of filling in the gaps in basic technology areas all on their own. In other words, there isn't much difference in the risks areas identified in projects being performed by computer-trained embedded system engineers vs. non-computer trained domain experts.
The gaps that were identified are largely either in a few system integration areas or in the broader area of software development process. Most computer engineers (and even many computer scientists) receive little software process training. Thus, most embedded system engineers don't see formal educational material that would fill these gaps.
We believe that plugging the gaps in embedded system projects isn't likely to be solved by having more engineers take existing embedded system college courses. The problem is really that these topics aren't being taught to (nor packaged for learning by) embedded designers. Rather, this data suggests that it might be useful to rethink the core skills that should be taught in embedded system courses and included in texts.
Our Course Approach
Informal awareness of the types of topics that cause problems in industry embedded projects has been guiding our graduate and undergraduate course content choice for a number of years. But, until we performed this study, we were operating on gut feel instead of data. As a result of this analysis we have updated a two-course embedded systems sequence to address most of the risk areas.
18-348 Embedded System
Engineering is mostly taught to thirdand fourth-year Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) undergraduate students. The syllabus might superficially appear to be an introduction to microcontrollers course using 16-bit CPUs. But, portions of lectures, homework assignments, and lab assignments have been crafted to instill an understanding of the basics of methodical software process. For example, every assignment has formally written requirements, and many assignments require documented peer reviews, designs, test plans, defined acceptance tests, and so on. These are lightweight approaches to instill awareness rather than rigorous treatment of process topics, largely because undergraduates lack the worldview and experience to appreciate and learn about process topics. Technology topics from this list taught at this level are concrete, technical, or linked directly to implementation: #11 modularity, #12 design before implement, #13 statecharts, #14 real time scheduling, #16 coding style, #19 globals, #20 compiler warnings, #21 concurrency, and #30 watchdog timers from the list previously given.
18-649 Distributed Embedded Systems is taught to ECE Masters
Degree students, usually in their first year of graduate school, and to fourth-year undergraduates as a follow-on to 18-348. Course lectures are divided into three parts: one third cover software process, one third cover embedded networking and distributed systems, and one third cover dependable and critical system design. Most of the remaining risk areas not covered by 18-348 are covered in this course, with the coverage increasing over time as lectures are modified to correspond to the risk area list. A semester-long course project is used to demonstrate the execution of process methods and (for students who are at a point that they are ready to learn the lesson) instill the value of having a lightweight but complete process for software development.
Industry Training
Outreach to industry is problematic since embedded developers are geographically scattered and often not local to the usual high technology cities. (Most of the design reviews were in the US Midwest, where companies build more embedded systems than computer systems. Only a few were near high-tech cities.) Despite advances in distance education, traditional university-run courses aren't doing a good job of reaching most of them.
To address this audience I have written a book that covers most of the topics in this list [4] . Each chapter gives a summary of issues and concrete solution approaches for risk areas. The hope is that having a book available will help solve some problems, and at the very least make it possible for developers to know where their gaps are so they can address them before they suffer a dramatic project failure. This book was adopted as the text for 18-649 starting in 2010.
Related Work
There has been little formalized work on attempting to analyze the needs of industry with regard to embedded systems. [2] is based in part on an analysis that takes into account industry surveys, and suggests that embedded system education should be more cross-disciplinary and more representative of embedded industry experiences. These are important observations and worthy goals. Our results extend these observations by reporting problems that even experienced industry designers aren't able to resolve on a consistent basis.
A number of embedded system educators emphasize some of the areas on our risk list, most typically the areas we identify for inclusion in 18-348 as well as distributed system and dependability topics. Examples include [1] , [7] , and previous courses at our institution [3] . Other curriculum proposals include an explicit software engineering courses (e.g., [8] ). No doubt there are some other degree programs that address most or all of these areas in one way or another (for example, our institution has an interdisciplinary Master of Science in Information Technology -Embedded Software Engineering degree [9] that requires both graduate embedded system technical courses and graduate software engineering courses). But such programs are not the norm. Our belief is that software process concepts should be central and integrated throughout the embedded curriculum rather than an optional or distinct course module.
Embedded system courses almost universally use hands-on project content as a way for students to get a feel for system integration issues. This certainly gives students experience in how difficult complex projects can be and gives them a chance to test their fundamental technical skills. However, we have found that even engineers who have been through a large number of industry design projects have gaps. Thus, we believe that merely experiencing a design project without guidance and reflection upon solid principles and these specific risk areas is not enough to fill these gaps. It is difficult to self-teach ways to fix problems when you don't ever realize you got things wrong.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper identifies 43 areas that were identified as red flag risk areas across reviews of 90 industry embedded system projects in the past decade. The most striking aspect of the list is that, by and large, even self-trained developers are not at huge risk of missing the basics of embedded systems. Rather, most risks are either complex system integration skills (e.g., concurrency management) or software development process issues (e.g., requirements problems or inadequate test plans).
While many of the areas identified might not seem specific to embedded systems, they are the risk areas that are actually affecting real embedded projects. Embedded educators should take notice and take steps to ensure that our future courses and degree programs address most of these areas, preferably in a way that teaches the skills most useful in an embedded system context.
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